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THE BIPARTISAN BAYH AMENDMENT:  
REPUBLICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Joel K. Goldstein* 
 
It is appropriate that Senator Birch Bayh has been widely recognized as 
the author and person most responsible for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  
His work was indispensable, and he was helped by other Democrats and 
nonpartisan actors including the American Bar Association and John D. 
Feerick, among others.  Yet the Amendment was also the product of 
bipartisan cooperation.  Important provisions were based on work done 
during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and 
Eisenhower and his Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, played important 
roles in supporting Bayh’s proposal as did other Republicans in and out of 
Congress.  Republicans like Representative Richard Poff pushed ideas and 
provisions that found their way into the Amendment, helped create important 
legislative history, and contributed in the legislative process.  Bayh’s 
legislative contribution included the inclusive manner in which he operated, 
and many Republicans deserve credit for participating constructively in a 
process they could not direct. 
In describing the bipartisan character of the Bayh Amendment, this Article 
seeks to fill a void in scholarly writing since no prior work has this focus.  It 
also uses the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as a case study of the sort of 
bipartisan effort on which any constitutional amendment depends.  And it 
suggests that the dispositions that produced the Twenty-Fifth Amendment—
in particular, communal problem solving based on a recognition of the need 
for interested parties to build from areas of agreement—would contribute to 
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succession and inability, a topic on which he is the nation’s foremost expert.  Katie Finnegan 
provided helpful research assistance.  This Article was prepared for the symposium entitled 
Continuity in the Presidency:  Gaps and Solutions held at Fordham University School of Law.  
For an overview of the symposium, see Matthew Diller, Foreword:  Continuity in the 
Presidency:  Gaps and Solutions, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 911 (2017). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Senator Birch Bayh, deservedly, is recognized as the person most 
responsible for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
addresses presidential succession and inability and vice presidential 
vacancy.1  The young, first-term Democratic Senator’s skill, commitment, 
and leadership were indispensable to the development, proposal, and 
ratification of the Amendment during the mid-1960s.2  Democratic 
Representative Emanuel Celler (New York) has also received credit for what 
was sometimes referred to as the “Bayh-Celler Amendment.”3  He performed 
important work on presidential inability during the 1950s and helped steer 
the Amendment through the House of Representatives in 1965.4  President 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 2. See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Lessons in Ensuring 
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 1006–07 (2010); Arthur Krock, In the 
Nation:  ‘The Best Obtainable’ Solution, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1965, at 30 (praising Bayh). 
 3. See, e.g., John D. Feerick, Vice Presidential Succession:  In Support of the Bayh-
Celler Plan, 18 S.C. L. REV. 226, 234 (1966); George D. Haimbaugh Jr., Vice Presidential 
Succession:  A Criticism of the Bayh-Cellar [sic] Plan, 17 S.C. L. REV. 315, 316 (1965) 
(referring to the “Bayh-Celler proposed amendment”). 
 4. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS:  THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 
238–40 (1965); John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 
34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 180–81, 186, 190–92 (1965).  
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Lyndon B. Johnson’s support helped too,5 as did the testimony of Nicholas 
Katzenbach, Johnson’s Deputy Attorney General and later Attorney 
General.6  Crucial nonpartisan contributions came from the American Bar 
Association (ABA),7 Lewis F. Powell Jr., then one of its leaders,8 and John 
D. Feerick, who played an extraordinary and diverse role as a scholar, 
activist, and citizen.9 
Republicans also contributed significantly to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  They helped conceive, promote, and advance the Amendment 
to its ultimate ratification.  Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell,10 
former President Dwight D. Eisenhower,11 former Vice President Richard M. 
Nixon,12 and Republican Representatives William McCulloch13 (Ohio) and 
Richard H. Poff14 (Virginia) were among those who played critical roles. 
Although earlier works have discussed the steps leading to the 
Amendment,15 no scholarly work has focused on the roles Republicans 
played in the achievement.  Without detracting from the credit appropriately 
given Bayh, other Democrats, and nonpartisan actors, it is important to focus 
on Republican contributions as well.  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was the 
product of bipartisan cooperation.16  Absent that quality, it would not have 
become part of the Constitution.17 
 
 5. John D. Feerick, Letter to the Editor, Presidential Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
1965, at 36 (crediting Bayh, Celler, and Johnson); Interview by Paige E. Mulhollan with Birch 
Bayh, U.S. Sen. from Ind. (Feb. 12, 1969) http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/ 
documents/archives/oral_histories/bayh_b/Bayh.PDF [https://perma.cc/Z9NP-Q7ST]. 
 6. See generally JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:  ITS COMPLETE 
HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 80–82, 92–93 (3d ed. 2014). 
 7. See 111 CONG. REC. 7940 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (stating that no one is “more 
deserving” than the ABA for the proposal of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment); 110 CONG. REC. 
22,983 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (giving “particular credit” to the ABA for doing “more 
than any single group” to help advance the amendment). 
 8. JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 201–04 (1994). 
 9. See LOWELL R. BECK, I FOUND MY NICHE:  A LIFETIME JOURNEY OF LOBBYING AND 
ASSOCIATION LEADERSHIP 91 (2016) (“It’s impossible to express enough the contributions 
John Feerick gave to obtaining the solution to Presidential Inability and Succession.”); Joel K. 
Goldstein, Introduction to FEERICK, supra note 6, at ix, xii; Joel K. Goldstein, Celebrating the 
50th of the 25th Amendment!, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2017, 3:31 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/589e1bb7e4b080bf74f03bcc [https://perma.cc/BY2R-
W8QU] (referencing Feerick’s roles). 
 10. BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 
112 (1968) (describing Brownell as a “great help”); id. at 162 (noting that Brownell was 
“invaluable”). 
 11. Id. at 75–76 (praising Eisenhower for his support). 
 12. Id. at 73 (stating that Nixon’s “experiences and opinions” were “valuable”); id. at 77 
(describing Nixon’s thoughts on succession and disability as “essential”). 
 13. Id. at 297 (noting that McCulloch was “very helpful”). 
 14. Id. (crediting Poff for his considerations and inquiries); Richard H. Poff, Presidential 
Inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, STUDENT L.J., Dec. 1965, at 15, 15. 
 15. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 6, at 105–07; Goldstein, supra note 2, at 998–1012.  See 
generally BAYH, supra note 10. 
 16. Feerick, supra note 4, at 203 (“The proposed twenty-fifth amendment has been made 
possible because of the willingness of Democrats and Republicans alike to compromise in the 
best interests of the Nation.”). 
 17. Id. 
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Far from diminishing the legislative achievement of Bayh and the other 
architects of the Amendment, its bipartisan nature is another significant 
reason to admire their work.  Bipartisanship did not just happen on the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  It was deliberately sought and carefully 
cultivated by people on both sides of the aisle.  The proponents understood 
the bipartisan requisite, and their successful efforts to practice an inclusive 
brand of problem-solving were an aspect of their accomplishment. 
This discussion does not simply supplement historical understanding of the 
events that led to Congress proposing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in the 
summer of 1965, although that is part of its intended contribution.  It also 
furnishes an instructive case study regarding formal constitutional 
amendment and bipartisan legislative collaboration generally.  Constitutional 
arithmetic makes bipartisanship a likely prerequisite to any constitutional 
amendment.  Moreover, the factors that produced legislative bipartisanship 
for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment offer lessons not only for cross-party 
cooperation but also for common action in a variety of contexts. 
This Article focuses on the bipartisan nature of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment by discussing events culminating with Congress’s proposal of 
the Amendment to the states in July 1965.  It is not a complete study of 
bipartisanship in connection with the Amendment because it does not discuss 
the ratification process in the states.  Its account of the legislative process is 
also incomplete because it omits many contributions by Democratic figures.  
These have been recognized elsewhere and are outside the scope of this 
Article.  Rather, this Article focuses on the contributions of Republican 
figures in the legislative process that culminated in Congress proposing the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the states in July 1965. 
Part I sketches the legal and political context in which the legislative 
deliberations occurred.  Part II describes the different ways in which various 
Republicans contributed to the proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Part III 
extracts some lessons from their contributions and the deliberations in 
general, especially the importance of bipartisanship during the legislative 
process.  Finally, Part IV puts bipartisanship in a larger context. 
I.  THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF 
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
A.  The Original Succession Clause and Eisenhower’s Proposal 
The text of the Constitution as it existed in the early 1960s suggested that 
presidential inability—like presidential death, resignation, or removal—
triggered some transfer of presidential power to the vice president.18  Yet 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, 
or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, 
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the 
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, 
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whereas law or practice made the existence and operation of the other three 
contingencies clear, presidential inability was characterized by ambiguity.  
The Constitution did not define inability or indicate how it was determined.  
Unlike the other three contingencies, the existence of which tends to be 
evident, inability can be controversial.  And whereas presidential death, 
resignation, or removal are inherently final events that separate the chief 
executive permanently from office, a presidential inability can be transitory, 
of indefinite duration, long lasting, or permanent.19  The first three 
contingencies create an automatic vacancy in fact; whether the fourth also 
does turns partly on the legal consequence attached to presidential inability. 
Vice President John Tyler’s claim that William Henry Harrison’s death in 
April 1841 made him President, not simply Vice President acting as 
President, was probably wrong,20 but little turned on it since Harrison’s death 
ended his claim to the office.  But, the text of the Constitution suggested that 
whatever devolved on the Vice President following death also devolved 
following inability.21  That textual symmetry created apprehensions that 
since the Vice President became President upon his predecessor’s death 
under the Tyler precedent, he might also do so during a presidential inability 
even if the inability proved transient.22  That concern was one factor that 
inhibited a transfer of power to Vice Presidents like Chester A. Arthur and 
Thomas Marshall during the incapacities of James Garfield and Woodrow 
Wilson, respectively.23 
Eisenhower, who suffered three presidential incapacities between 
September 1955 and late November 1957,24 focused on ensuring that 
presidential illness would not impede effective presidential leadership, an 
increasingly serious problem during the Cold War and nuclear age.25  
Although some thought Congress could address the issue by statute, most 
thought a constitutional amendment was necessary to address presidential 
 
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until 
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”). 
 19. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  The 
Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE 
25TH AMENDMENT 165, 198–200 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000) (discussing various 
contingencies). 
 20. See FEERICK, supra note 4, at 50 (stating that original-intent evidence shows that the 
Vice President “was merely intended to discharge the powers and duties of the President 
temporarily”); Joel K. Goldstein, History and Constitutional Interpretation:  Some Lessons 
from the Vice Presidency, 69 ARK. L. REV. 647, 668–74 (2016) (“[O]riginal history seemed to 
suggest that the Vice President would simply act as, but not become, President . . . .”). 
 21. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 674. 
 22. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 966–67. 
 23. FEERICK, supra note 4, at 135–36, 170–72; Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential 
Behavior in a Disability Crisis:  The Case of Thomas R. Marshall, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, 
at 37, 46–47. 
 24. Eisenhower suffered a heart attack on September 24, 1955. IRWIN F. GELLMAN, THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE APPRENTICE:  EISENHOWER AND NIXON, 1952–1961, at 260 (2015).  He had 
an ileitis operation on June 9, 1956. Id. at 308.  And he suffered a stroke on November 25, 
1957. Id. at 364; see also FEERICK, supra note 6, at 19–23. 
 25. See Herbert Brownell Jr., Presidential Disability:  The Need for a Constitutional 
Amendment, 68 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1958); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 964. 
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inability.26  Speaking through Attorney General Brownell, the Eisenhower 
administration proposed a constitutional amendment in April 1957 which 
distinguished presidential inability from cases of death, resignation, or 
removal.27  In the latter three, consistent with the Tyler precedent, the Vice 
President became President;28 in the former, he simply exercised presidential 
powers and duties during the inability.29  The proposed amendment allowed 
the President to declare his inability in writing, at which point the Vice 
President acted as President.30  If the President failed or was unable to declare 
his inability, the Vice President upon written approval “of a majority of the 
heads of executive departments who are members of the President’s Cabinet” 
could declare the President’s disability.31  In either event, the President’s 
written statement of his ability would allow him to resume presidential 
functions.32  The Eisenhower proposal kept decision-making within the 
executive branch and rejected any role for a presidential inability 
commission.33  The proposal was criticized for not providing sufficient 
protection should a disabled President assert his capacity to act; as a result, 
other proposals were offered.34  Ultimately, no legislative action followed.35 
The following year, Brownell’s successor, William P. Rogers, endorsed 
Brownell’s proposed amendment with an added provision.36  The 
modification stated that if the Vice President and Cabinet disagreed with the 
President’s assertion of ability to resume the discharge of the powers and 
duties of his office, Congress must resolve the dispute.37  In March 1958, a 
bipartisan group of Senators introduced a revised form of this approach, 
which provided that if the Vice President and Cabinet disagreed with the 
President’s declaration of his capacity, Congress would decide the issue.38  A 
two-thirds vote in both houses was needed to sustain the Vice President’s 
claim.39  Even so, the President could later resume the discharge of his 
 
 26. The Constitution empowered Congress to provide by statute “for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what 
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability 
be removed, or a President shall be elected.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.  The grant of power 
to address a dual vacancy was interpreted to preclude Congress from addressing simply 
presidential inability. See Ruth C. Silva, Presidential Succession and Disability, 21 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 646, 662 (1956). 
 27. Presidential Inability:  Hearing Before the Special Subcomm. on Study of Presidential 
Inability of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 4–5, 7–8 (1957) [hereinafter 1957 
House Hearings] (statement of Herbert Brownell Jr., Att’y Gen.). 
 28. Id. at 7. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 8. 
 32. Id.; Brownell, supra note 25, at 197. 
 33. Brownell, supra note 25, at 197–200. 
 34. Feerick, supra note 4, at 181. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Brownell, supra note 25, at 201. 
 37. Id. at 201–02. 
 38. Id. at 207; see S.J. Res. 161, 85th Cong. (1958). 
 39. S.J. Res. 161 § 4. 
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powers and duties by agreement of the “Acting President” or by a majority 
vote in each house.40  Although the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments endorsed the Eisenhower-Brownell-Rogers amendment,41 
Congress took no action in 1958 or the following years.42 
With no sign that Congress would act, Eisenhower entered into a letter 
agreement with Vice President Nixon as a stopgap measure.43  It provided 
that either Eisenhower or Nixon could determine that Eisenhower was 
disabled, thereby transferring presidential powers and duties to Nixon until 
Eisenhower concluded that he was able to resume their discharge, at which 
point he would do so.44  Eisenhower rejected the formalistic conclusion that 
the Constitution’s textual symmetry extended the Tyler precedent to 
presidential inability.45  Instead, he preferred the common-sense idea that the 
Constitution should allow a temporary transfer of presidential powers and 
duties to handle what might be a transient inability, even if custom dictated a 
permanent succession to the office when the triggering event produced an 
inherently enduring vacancy due to death, resignation, or removal.46  
Eisenhower established the idea that either the President or Vice President 
could trigger the transfer, but the President could reclaim power.47  Finally, 
Eisenhower wrote to Nixon privately that if “any group of distinguished 
medical authorities” Nixon assembled concluded that the President had a 
permanent disability, Eisenhower would resign; however, if he did not, 
Nixon should assume the presidency nonetheless.48  The Eisenhower-Nixon 
agreement was made public in part49 and largely followed by President John 
F. Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson;50 President Johnson and 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, John McCormack;51 and President 
Johnson and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey.52 
Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, had previously introduced Senate Joint 
 
 40. Id.; see also Note, Legislation:  Presidential Disability and Succession, 32 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 357, 365 (1958). 
 41. Feerick, supra note 4, at 182. 
 42. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 53. 
 43. Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to Procedures in the Event 
of Presidential Disability, PUB. PAPERS 196 (Mar. 3, 1958). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 677–78. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 676 & n.199. 
 48. Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard Milhous Nixon (Feb. 5, 1958), in 19 
THE PAPERS OF DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER 711, 711–13 (Louis Galambos & Daun Van Ee 
eds., 2001). 
 49.  See Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to Procedures in the 
Event of Presidential Disability, supra note 43. 
 50. White House Statement and Text of Agreement Between the President and the Vice 
President on Procedures in the Event of Presidential Inability, PUB. PAPERS 561 (Aug. 10, 
1961) (describing the agreement between Kennedy and Johnson). 
 51. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 320–37 (providing the original agreements between Johnson 
and McCormack). 
 52. Statement of Procedures for Use in the Event of Presidential Inability, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1044 (Oct. 5, 1965). 
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Resolution 161 (“S.J. Res. 161”) in 195853 and Senate Joint Resolution 28 
(“S.J. Res. 28”) in 1963,54 both of which essentially followed the 
Eisenhower-Brownell-Rogers approach.55  However, he subsequently joined 
with Senator Kenneth Keating, the ranking minority member of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, in introducing Senate Joint 
Resolution 35 (“S.J. Res. 35”) in 1963.56  This resolution provided that in the 
event of a presidential inability, the Vice President would simply discharge 
the powers and duties of the office without assuming the office, but also 
authorized Congress to provide by statute how and by whom the beginning 
and end of presidential inability would be determined.57  The ABA supported 
this congressional-enabling approach,58 Deputy Attorney General Nicholas 
deB. Katzenbach testified in favor of it for the Kennedy administration,59 and 
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments reported it to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on June 25, 1963.60  Kefauver, however, died on August 
10, 1963, before further action occurred.61 
In autumn of 1963, Congress seemed unlikely to address presidential 
inability.  The title of John D. Feerick’s first article on the subject, “The 
Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?,”62 
suggested pessimism.  His letter of November 8, 1963, which the New York 
Times published nine days later, observed that “Congress has consistently 
failed the American people by not acting” to address problems regarding 
presidential inability.63 
President Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, created 
renewed interest in the subject of presidential continuity.64  The Cold War 
was near its height in the nuclear age with the Cuban Missile Crisis occurring 
only thirteen months earlier, which added urgency to the question of 
presidential leadership.65  The then-existing Presidential Succession Act of 
 
 53. S.J. Res. 161, 85th Cong. (1958).  Joining Kefauver were Democrats Thomas 
Hennings (Missouri) and Olin D. Johnston (South Carolina) and Republicans Everett Dirksen 
(Illinois), Roman Hruska (Nebraska), William Langer (North Dakota), Arthur Watkins (Utah), 
William Jenner (Indiana), and John M. Butler (Maryland). 
 54. S.J. Res. 28, 88th Cong. (1963). 
 55. BAYH, supra note 10, at 26–28. 
 56. S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong. (1963); BAYH, supra note 10, at 27–28. 
 57. S.J. Res. 35. 
 58. Presidential Inability:  Hearings on S.J. Res. 28, S.J. Res. 35, and S.J. Res. 84 Before 
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 
13–17 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Senate Hearings] (statement of Lewis F. Powell Jr., President-
Elect Nominee, American Bar Association). 
 59. Id. at 32 (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
 60. S. REP. NO. 88-1017, at 2 (1964). 
 61. Feerick, supra note 4, at 183; see JOSEPH BRUCE GORMAN, KEFAUVER:  A POLITICAL 
BIOGRAPHY 367 (1971). 
 62. John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, 
32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1963). 
 63. John D. Feerick, Letter to the Editor, Fixing Presidential Succession, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 1963, at E8. 
 64. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 965. 
 65. See id. at 964. 
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194766 placed the Speaker of the House and Senate President pro tempore 
immediately after the Vice President in the line of presidential succession and 
then extended the line through the Cabinet.67  Concern was magnified by the 
fact that Johnson suffered a serious heart attack in 195568 and those next in 
line of succession, Speaker John McCormack and Senate President pro 
tempore Carl Hayden, were elderly69 and not regarded as presidential 
timber.70 
These circumstances focused attention on the line of succession following 
the Vice President in addition to presidential inability.71  Legislative and 
Cabinet succession each had proponents and critics, and the recent rise of the 
vice presidency beginning with Nixon’s term72 prompted a belief that filling 
a vice presidential vacancy presented the best means to deal with presidential 
succession and one which would also reduce the importance of the rest of the 
line.73 
Bayh, having succeeded Kefauver as chairman of the Senate 
Subcommittee in late September 1963,74 seized the opportunity to use the 
national tragedy to galvanize Congress to act.  The first step was to formulate 
a proposal.  Congress had offered two bipartisan options for addressing 
presidential inability:  the Eisenhower-Brownell-Rogers approach, which 
Kefauver had initially supported75 and which specified procedures for 
transferring presidential powers voluntarily or involuntarily,76 and the 
Keating-Kefauver congressional-enabling approach (Senate Joint Resolution 
35), which Katzenbach77 and the ABA had endorsed.78  Two days after 
 
 66. The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified 
as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012)). 
 67. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b). 
 68. FEERICK, supra note 4, at 6; Goldstein, supra note 2, at 965. 
 69. Two Old Timers Next in Line for Presidency of U.S., CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1963, at 30. 
 70. See James Reston, The Problem of Succession to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 
1963, at 33 (discussing McCormack’s unsuitability for presidency); The Succession, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 10, 1963, at 20 (referring to Johnson’s heart attack and the advanced age of his 
potential successors); see also Robert E. Gilbert, The Genius of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  
Guarding Against Presidential Disability but Safeguarding the Presidency, in MANAGING 
CRISIS:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT, supra note 19, at 25, 30; 
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 965. 
 71. See John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the Problems of Presidential 
Succession and Inability, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 457, 457–458 & n.3 (1964) (describing the 
media’s discussion of problems). 
 72. See generally JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION (1982). 
 73. Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
505, 536–40 (1995). 
 74. BAYH, supra note 10, at 29. 
 75. S.J. Res. 28, 88th Cong. (1963). 
 76. Id. 
 77. 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 32 (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, 
Deputy Att’y Gen.). 
 78. Id. at 15–16 (statement of Lewis F. Powell Jr., President-Elect Nominee, American 
Bar Association); see S.J. Res. 84, 88th Cong. (1963).  Senate Joint Resolution 84 was 
proposed by Senators Roman Hruska and John McClellan. See S.J. Res. 84, 88th Cong. (1963).  
It resembled S.J. Res. 35, but required that congressionally mandated procedures be consistent 
with separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. Id. § 2. 
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Kennedy’s assassination, the New York Times called for Congress to adopt 
the Keating approach.79 
B.  Incorporating Eisenhower’s Proposal 
Bayh determined that he preferred the Eisenhower-Kefauver “specific 
procedural constitutional amendment” to the Keating-Katzenbach 
congressional-enabling approach.80  Bayh thought that S.J. Res. 35 
insufficiently protected the President’s position, doubted that state 
legislatures would give Congress a blank check, and worried that the 
proposal’s failure to prescribe procedures might result in Congress deferring 
indefinitely the task of coming up with some.81  Bayh thought that Congress 
needed to develop procedures promptly while the trauma of Kennedy’s 
assassination still provided an incentive to act, not simply to obtain power to 
legislate in the future.82  He also thought that filling a vice presidential 
vacancy was the most pressing problem83 and proposed to remedy that 
deficiency by allowing the President to nominate a Vice President to be 
confirmed by Congress.84  Such an innovation would diminish the 
importance of who followed the Vice President in the line of succession, but 
Bayh also favored replacing the legislative leaders with the Cabinet to keep 
succession within the executive branch.85 
Within three weeks of Kennedy’s assassination, Bayh had introduced 
Senate Joint Resolution 139 (“S.J. Res. 139”), a proposed constitutional 
amendment addressing presidential succession, vice presidential vacancy, 
and presidential inability, and he announced that his Subcommittee would 
conduct hearings early in 1964.86  In crafting S.J. Res. 139, Bayh took the 
basic provisions regarding presidential inability from the Eisenhower-
Brownell-Rogers proposal with some changes, while adding a new section to 
fill vice presidential vacancies by presidential nomination subject to 
confirmation by both houses of Congress.87  As modified during the next 
nineteen months, S.J. Res. 139 formed the basis for the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, which Congress proposed in the summer of 1965 and which 
received the required three-fourths ratification of the states by February 10, 
1967. 
Although the Kennedy assassination focused attention on the subject, it did 
not produce an immediate consensus regarding a solution.  The following 
period produced many suggested reforms regarding presidential succession 
 
 79. Editorial, The Presidential Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1963, at 94. 
 80. BAYH, supra note 10, at 32, 34–35. 
 81. Id. at 30, 32, 34–35. 
 82. See id. at 34–35. 
 83. Id. at 32. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See S.J. Res. 139, 88th Cong. § 6 (1963). 
 86. 109 CONG. REC. 24,420 (1963); John D. Morris, Study of Succession Is Planned in 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1963, at 1. 
 87. BAYH, supra note 10, at 35; FEERICK, supra note 4, at 244. 
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and inability and vice presidential vacancy.  Eisenhower, for instance, 
initially proposed changing the line of succession to run through the Cabinet 
whereas McCormack and former President Harry S. Truman endorsed the 
existing line beginning with legislative leaders.88  Additionally, whereas 
Bayh thought a constitutional amendment was required,89 some thought the 
issues of succession and inability could be addressed by statute.90  Those who 
favored some constitutional amendment were nonetheless divided among a 
variety of ways to fill a vice presidential vacancy and address inability.91  The 
proposals included holding a special presidential election following a 
succession during the first half of a presidential term,92 selecting two Vice 
Presidents,93 allowing one94 or both95 houses to elect a Vice President 
without a presidential nomination or from a list of prospective nominees,96 
or reconvening the Electoral College,97 as well as several other options.98  
Regarding presidential inability, some, like Keating, favored an enabling 
amendment99 whereas others suggested an “inability commission.”100 
A constitutional amendment as Bayh proposed would, of course, impose a 
heavy burden.  Article V of the Constitution, which governs constitutional 
amendment, requires common action by the House of Representatives, the 
Senate, and the states, and it imposes a daunting supermajority requirement 
at each stage.101  The House and Senate must propose an amendment by a 
two-thirds vote and three-fourths of the states must ratify it for it to become 
part of the Constitution.102  That extraordinary level of consensus makes 
constitutional amendments difficult and, accordingly, rare.  Democrats held 
 
 88. Eisenhower Asks Succession Shift:  Favors Secretary of State to Follow Vice 
President, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1963, at 69; Thomas P. Ronan, Eisenhower, Truman and Nixon 
Weigh Presidential Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1964, at 19. 
 89. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:  Hearings on S.J. 
Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 3 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch 
Bayh, Chairman, Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary) 
(“These questions can be solved by amending the Constitution.  Some say they could best be 
solved by statute.  Frankly, I disagree.  Many distinguished lawyers disagree.  What most 
lawyers agree upon is that if there exists a reasonable constitutional doubt, the best method to 
eradicate any doubt is to amend the Constitution.”). 
 90. Id.; FEERICK, supra note 6, at 58 (noting that several “proponents felt that Congress 
had the power to legislate procedures” to resolve the questions of presidential inability and 
succession). 
 91. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 59–71. 
 92. S.J. Res. 13, 88th Cong. (1963). 
 93. S.J. Res. 143, 88th Cong. (1963); S.J. Res. 140, 88th Cong. (1963). 
 94. H.R.J. Res. 818, 88th Cong. (1963) (proposing a constitutional amendment whereby 
the Senate would elect a Vice President). 
 95. S.J. Res. 147, 88th Cong. (1963); S.J. Res. 138, 88th Cong. (1963). 
 96. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 79–80 (statement of Sen. Frank Church). 
 97. Id. at 237 (statement of Richard M. Nixon, former Vice President). 
 98. See FEERICK, supra note 6, at 64–71; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 72, at 233–39 (presenting 
various plans regarding vice presidential vacancy); Feerick, supra note 71, at 487–89 & 
nn.168–77. 
 99. S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong. (1963). 
 100. FEERICK, supra note 6, at 62. 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 102. Id. 
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sixty-six of 100 seats in the Senate and 258 of 435 in the House between 1963 
and 1964—not enough to reach the two-thirds threshold in either house even 
assuming perfect party discipline.  Substantial opposition in either house 
would likely encourage resistance elsewhere.  Any successful amendment 
would require bipartisan cooperation. 
Yet issues regarding presidential succession and inability often sparked 
partisan conflict, not cooperation.  In the early 1790s, when Congress first 
sought to create a line of succession behind the Vice President, Alexander 
Hamilton and his Federalist allies had favored a legislative line in part to 
avoid placing Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson second in line to the 
presidency,103 whereas Jeffersonians, like James Madison, had argued for 
Cabinet succession.104  In 1919 and 1920, Republicans seemed disinclined to 
contribute to a resolution of Woodrow Wilson’s disability, concluding that it 
hurt the Democrats.105  In 1947, Republicans seemed more enthusiastic about 
placing legislative leaders after the Vice President, perhaps because 
Republican Joe Martin was Speaker of the House rather than Democrat 
Senator Sam Rayburn, who held the position the year prior.  Although the 
House voted on a bipartisan basis to elevate the speaker, the Senate voted 
along party lines in support of the measure, which placed two Republican 
legislators, not a Democratic Secretary of State, next in line.106  Democratic 
congressional leaders reportedly balked at addressing inability issues during 
Eisenhower’s second term for fear that a resolution would elevate Nixon’s 
standing and suggest that Eisenhower was more ill than known.107 
The questions about McCormack’s fitness to be next in line introduced a 
further complication.  They added urgency to reform efforts but also impeded 
them.  Since some members of the House feared that action might seem to 
impugn McCormack’s fitness, they resisted moving forward.108  Bayh’s 
original proposal, which would have placed Cabinet members rather than 
legislative leaders after the Vice President,109 probably exacerbated the 
problem.  Even when Bayh dropped that provision, McCormack was 
reportedly cool to the measure.110  It became clear that the House of 
 
 103. FEERICK, supra note 4, at 60–61. 
 104. Joel K. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 
67, 86 (2010). 
 105. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 42–43; see ROSE MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL 
LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS AND DECISION MAKING 65–66 (2008). 
 106. Feerick, supra note 71, at 481–83, 482 nn.156–57.  The bill, which made the Speaker, 
followed by the President pro tempore, next in the line of succession behind the Vice President, 
passed in the House by a vote of 365 to 11. Id. at 482.  Only ten Democrats and one Republican 
opposed the bill. Id. at 482 n.157.  In the Senate, the bill passed by a vote of 50 to 35. Id. at 
482.  Forty-seven Republicans and three Democrats voted in favor of the bill and thirty-five 
Democrats voted against it. Id. at 482 n.156. 
 107. HERBERT BROWNELL WITH JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE:  THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT 
BROWNELL 277–78 (1993). 
 108. Feerick, supra note 4, at 186 n.55. 
 109. See S.J. Res. 139, 88th Cong. § 6 (1963). 
 110. Change Doubted in Succession Law:  Senate Panel Narrows Hunt for Solution on 
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1964, at 40. 
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Representatives would not address presidential succession until after a new 
President and Vice President were inaugurated in January 1965.111  
Ironically, the House’s delay allowed the Senate to claim the initiative and 
largely define the basic shape of the proposal. 
II.  REPUBLICAN CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this promising but uncertain environment, the actions of Republicans, 
as well as Democrats, helped produce the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Bayh’s 
proposal ultimately defined the basic terms of the Amendment, but 
Republicans made crucial contributions to the shape and legislative success 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Many of these contributions were 
interrelated and some Republicans contributed in diverse ways. 
A.  Incorporating a Republican Proposal 
The first way in which Republicans contributed to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment has already been mentioned—S.J. Res. 139 and its successor 
regarding presidential succession and inability largely followed the 
Eisenhower-Brownell-Rogers approach.  Although Bayh’s proposal differed 
in some particulars, like Eisenhower-Brownell-Rogers, it embraced the Tyler 
precedent for presidential death, resignation, and removal (but not inability), 
provided for the voluntary transfer of presidential powers and duties by the 
President on a temporary basis and the involuntary transfer of presidential 
powers and duties by the Vice President with Cabinet support, and specified 
that Congress would resolve a dispute regarding the President’s subsequent 
ability to exercise presidential powers and duties.112  Bayh acknowledged,113 
and perceptive Republicans114 and observers115 noticed, the Republican 
connection to these ideas. 
B.  Early Prominent Republican Supporters 
If Bayh had constructed a wish list of coveted Republican supporters, 
Eisenhower, Nixon, and Brownell would have likely been at or near the top.  
Eisenhower was the beloved, former two-term President who had 
experienced and taken responsible action to address presidential inability.  
Nixon, the 1960 Republican presidential candidate, was Vice President 
 
 111. BAYH, supra note 10, at 92–93, 95. 
 112. Id. at 35–36. 
 113. Id. at 35 (stating that former Attorney General Brownell’s first proposal, as modified 
by Rogers and Kefauver, “came closest to achieving the goals we believed to be important” 
and became the “basis for our constitutional amendment”). 
 114. See, e.g., Presidential Inability:  Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 72 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. 
John V. Lindsay) (suggesting that the Bayh-Celler plan was “an almost exact restatement of 
the original Brownell proposal” made to the eighty-fifth Congress); see also 111 CONG. REC. 
7948 (1965) (statement of Rep. Lindsay) (making same observation); BROWNELL, supra note 
107, at 278 (describing the Eisenhower provisions as providing the “nucleus” of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment). 
 115. Feerick, supra note 4, at 184 (noting that Bayh’s “provisions were essentially the same 
as those embodied in the revised Eisenhower Administration approach”). 
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during both the office’s migration to the executive branch and Eisenhower’s 
incapacities.  Brownell had studied the issue as Eisenhower’s Attorney 
General during his disabilities and enjoyed great prestige.  Within a few 
months, all three had endorsed most of S.J. 139 and played important roles 
in enhancing its prospects for success. 
1.  Herbert Brownell 
Brownell played multiple roles and his multifaceted contributions were 
critical to the Amendment’s success.116  His past activities and conclusions 
made his early support of Bayh’s approach unsurprising.  He was a key 
participant in a blue-ribbon ABA group that met in January 1964 to consider 
the subject117 and formulated principles consistent with Bayh’s proposal, 
which the ABA endorsed on February 17, 1964,118 thereby switching its 
support from Keating’s to Bayh’s approach.  The ABA’s support made an 
enormous difference in achieving the success of the proposal and the 
ratification of the Amendment.119 
Brownell provided important support for Bayh’s proposal as a witness 
when Bayh’s Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments held hearings on 
February 25, 1964.120  In his testimony, Brownell agreed that a constitutional 
amendment was needed121 and endorsed the presidential inability122 and vice 
presidential vacancy123 provisions of S.J. Res. 139.  Brownell explained that 
the participants at the ABA conference the prior month had overcome their 
“widely” divergent views to achieve consensus because “they all agreed that 
the dire necessities of promptly solving the problems outweighed their 
individual preferences.”124  Brownell was a persuasive advocate for Bayh’s 
proposal with enormous credibility.  He was able to contradict Keating’s 
view that state legislators would be more likely to support an enabling 
amendment rather than one detailing procedures;125 Brownell’s experience 
of five terms in the New York State Assembly no doubt added weight to his 
 
 116. See BAYH, supra note 10, at 162 (stating that Brownell had become “invaluable” by 
December 1964). 
 117. Id. at 49 (describing Brownell as part of a “nucleus” in the ABA meeting favoring 
Bayh’s approach). 
 118. See Feerick, supra note 4, at 185. 
 119. John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment:  Its Origins and History, in 
MANAGING CRISIS:  PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT, supra note 19, at 
1, 15; see JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY:  THE UNCERTAINTIES OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 59, 70 (2015). 
 120. Marjorie Hunter, Presidential Succession Plan Given, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1964, at 
16 (reporting that Brownell’s testimony was consistent with Bayh plan). 
 121. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 135 (statement of Herbert Brownell, former 
Att’y Gen.). 
 122. Id. at 136. 
 123. Id. at 137. 
 124. Id. at 138. 
 125. Id. at 141–42. 
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opinion126 and reinforced Bayh’s own analysis based on his service in the 
Indiana General Assembly.127 
When the ABA hosted the National Forum on Presidential Inability and 
Vice Presidential Vacancy in Washington, D.C., on May 25, 1964, to educate 
more than 500 leaders from around the country, Brownell was part of the 
featured panel along with Bayh, Celler, and Edward L. Wright, chair of the 
ABA House of Delegates.128  Brownell presented the history of the problem 
and explained the need for a constitutional amendment to address presidential 
inability.129  As shown below, however, Brownell’s contributions that day 
went well beyond his public comments. 
Brownell chaired the ABA’s Committee on Presidential Inability and 
Vice-Presidential Vacancy and in that capacity testified before Bayh’s 
Subcommittee again on January 29, 1965, as a main witness during the 
single-day hearing.130  Brownell again supported Bayh’s proposal,131 now 
Senate Joint Resolution 1 (“S.J. Res. 1”),132 and responded to arguments and 
questions advanced by various Republicans.133  Brownell supported Bayh’s 
approach to hold separate votes of the House and Senate to confirm a vice 
presidential nominee134 and to allow either the Cabinet or Vice President to 
initiate a disability determination,135 and he supported the approach of S.J. 
Res. 1 generally on disability.136  Brownell also testified before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary on February 17, 1965,137 where he again 
emphasized the importance of Congress addressing the problem, supported 
the Bayh-Celler proposal, and responded to extensive questions, especially 
from Republican members.138 
Brownell’s influence was further reflected by the extent to which some of 
his ideas helped shape the defense of the proposals that became the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.  For instance, in testifying before the Senate 
 
 126. BROWNELL, supra note 107, at 23–31. 
 127. BAYH, supra note 10, at 34–35. 
 128. ABA National Forum on Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy (May 
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 129. Herbert Brownell, The History of the Problem, Remarks at the ABA National Forum 
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preference for a joint session of Congress to confirm a vice presidential nominee); id. at 64 
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 135. Id. at 65–66. 
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Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments in 1964, Brownell had 
repeated an idea from his 1958 Yale Law Journal article139—that “ultimately 
the operation of any constitutional arrangement depends on public opinion 
and . . . ‘constitutional morality’” rather than procedural guarantees and that 
“[n]o mechanical or procedural solution will provide a complete answer if 
one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of the parties are rogues and 
in which no popular sense of constitutional propriety exists.”140  Brownell 
went on to endorse the combination of the Vice President and Cabinet as the 
“the most feasible formula” consistent with constitutional principles.141  
Brownell’s formulation was incorporated without attribution in the Senate 
and House reports that accompanied S.J. Res. 139142 and House of 
Representatives Joint Resolution 1 (“H.R.J. Res. 1”),143 and the idea echoed 
in important discussions during congressional deliberations.144 
Brownell’s skill, leadership, credibility, and commitment to the principles 
and procedures that led to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment played an important 
role in its eventual success.145  He was a compelling witness but also played 
an important role in securing ABA support for Bayh’s proposal and in other 
behind-the-scenes roles described below. 
2.  Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Eisenhower provided important support for S.J. Res. 139 even while 
disagreeing on some particulars.  In a letter dated March 2, 1964, which Bayh 
made public on March 4, 1964,146 Eisenhower agreed that a constitutional 
amendment was necessary and endorsed Bayh’s proposal to fill a vice 
presidential vacancy.147  He thought the President should announce his own 
disability “[w]herever possible,” but if “circumstances made this 
impossible,” the Vice President should announce the disability and assume 
 
 139. Brownell, supra note 25, at 200.  Brownell had also articulated this idea in his 1957 
testimony before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives addressing presidential 
inability. See 1957 House Hearings, supra note 27, at 31 (statement of Herbert Brownell Jr., 
Att’y Gen.). 
 140. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 136 (statement of Herbert Brownell Jr., 
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 141. Id. 
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 147. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 232 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) 
(reprinting Eisenhower’s letter). 
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presidential powers “with the concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet.”148  
In either case, Eisenhower strongly agreed that the Vice President was simply 
acting as president temporarily.149  The one instance where Eisenhower 
departed from Bayh’s approach regarding presidential inability was in his 
suggestion that a dispute between the president and vice president should be 
resolved by a disability commission consisting of some Cabinet members, 
legislative leaders, and medical professionals.150 
Eisenhower was the featured speaker at the ABA’s National Forum in May 
1964.  Brownell had recruited Eisenhower for that assignment and lobbied 
him to abandon his support for a disability commission.151  Brownell and 
Bayh approached Eisenhower during the reception before his speech to argue 
against the commission proposed in his March 1964 letter.152  In his speech, 
Eisenhower unequivocally supported section 2 of Bayh’s proposal and 
praised the vice presidency as a vehicle for succession.153  Regarding 
inability, Eisenhower argued that presidential inability needed to be solved 
“now” through a constitutional amendment and supporting legislation.154  
Eisenhower thought the Vice President should make the decision, assuming 
the President did not initiate the transfer himself.155  Although his remarks 
were ambiguous regarding how much the amendment should detail and how 
much should be left to statute, he made no reference to a commission and 
was open to Cabinet participation with Congress as an umpire of an 
intraexecutive branch dispute,156 thus bringing his position close to Bayh’s 
proposal. 
Eisenhower’s impact went beyond the immediate audience to the millions 
of those who read accounts of his speech across the country.157  His unique 
stature guaranteed coverage and his popularity made his support significant.  
“Truly we had made great progress that day,” Bayh wrote later.158  Bayh 
thought that Eisenhower “had fired the audience, and through the press the 
country at large, with the urgency of working out a solution to the problems 
of Presidential succession and disability.”159  Eisenhower had provided “a 
real boost.”160 
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3.  Richard M. Nixon 
Former Vice President Nixon was a third Republican luminary who 
provided important support for S.J. Res. 139.  His testimony highlighted the 
final day of the first round of Senate hearings on March 5, 1964.161  Nixon 
had previously proposed that a vice presidential vacancy be filled by a 
presidential nomination confirmed by the presidential electors from the most 
recent presidential election, and he adhered to that preference during his 
testimony.162  However, Nixon backed the disability approach of S.J. 
Res. 139 and specifically criticized Eisenhower’s then-recent disability 
commission proposal; he believed that Congress should resolve an 
intraexecutive branch dispute as Bayh’s proposal provided.163  Nixon also 
agreed that a constitutional amendment was needed.164  He elaborated on the 
importance of the vice presidency, predicted its further growth, and opposed 
Keating’s two-vice presidents proposal as likely to diminish the office,165 all 
of which had particular credibility because of Nixon’s own contributions to 
the growth of the vice presidency.166  Nixon agreed with Bayh that a vice 
presidential vacancy needed to be filled.167 
Bayh later described Nixon as “an exceptional witness” and his statement 
as “the most effective of our entire series of hearings.”168  Nixon’s 
appearance attracted wide media coverage.169  Bayh thought that Nixon’s 
contribution “was of inestimable inherent value,”170 not only for the positions 
recounted above but also for reasons discussed below. 
The three Republican luminaries clearly had an impact.  The Washington 
Post began its editorial of March 9, 1964, supporting a constitutional 
amendment by referencing the calls of Eisenhower and Nixon for action on 
presidential inability.171  Their vocal support no doubt encouraged others to 
follow.172 
C.  Creating a Climate for a Cooperative Effort 
Nixon’s primary contribution was not, however, in his support for most of 
Bayh’s approach but in his eloquent insistence that interested parties put 
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aside their differences and reach consensus.  Nixon modeled that behavior in 
his testimony given extemporaneously for about thirty minutes.173  Nixon 
began, and ended, his direct testimony by underlining the importance of 
Bayh’s work, calling Bayh’s hearings the “most important hearings”174 being 
conducted in Washington because they involved “the future of the United 
States as no other hearings perhaps in recent years have.”175 
Nixon had “strong convictions”176 that his proposals were “the best 
approach”177 but did not insist that they were “the only way to handle the 
problem.”178  He stated, “what is important is not that this committee adopt 
my proposals, what is important is that this committee make a 
recommendation to the Congress, to the Senate, and to the Nation which will 
get action on these two problems, the problem of succession and the problem 
of disability.”179  Nixon thought that “the time ha[d] come” for Bayh’s 
Subcommittee to identify “a united proposal” and to act while the sense of 
urgency from the Kennedy assassination remained.180  It was “imperative that 
this problem [of disability] be dealt with and dealt with now.”181  When asked 
whether he would prefer an amendment specifying a procedure or enabling 
Congress to take further action, Nixon replied, “[t]he approach I would prefer 
is the one that this committee finally concludes has the best chance to 
success.”182  Nixon emphasized, “all of the nit-picking arguments” between 
approaches “make very little impression on me” and “our major 
concern . . . is to find a solution that will be least controversial but will get at 
the major problem.”183  In his view, the Subcommittee should collect ideas 
and adopt “the best idea in [its] opinion, and [] get the public support and go 
forward with it.”184  Nixon would support the Subcommittee’s judgment 
because “the important thing is to get action and get it fast.”185  Nixon’s 
promise set a powerful example; the most recent Republican presidential 
nominee was basically giving a blank check to a subcommittee with a 
Democratic chair. 
Other Republicans showed dispositions consistent with Nixon’s guidance.  
Republican Senator Jacob Javits (New York), for instance, had previously 
amended his Senate Joint Resolution 138 (“S.J. Res. 138”) to bring it closer 
 
 173. Russell Baker, Nixon, in Capitol, Essays 2 Roles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1964, at 15. 
 174. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 234. 
 175. Id.; id. at 242–43 (“[T]here is no decision that is more vital to the future of this 
country . . . .”). 
 176. Id. at 234. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 238. 
 179. Id. at 234. 
 180. Id. at 235. 
 181. Id. at 241.  
 182. Id. at 244. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 250. 
 185. Id. 
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to S.J. Res. 139,186 which he later agreed to cosponsor.187  Keating, though 
still preferring his two-Vice Presidents-and-enabling approach, suggested in 
late March 1964 that he would support S.J. Res. 139 if the Senate preferred 
it to his proposal.188 
When House Democrats subjected Bayh to aggressive and skeptical 
questioning as he testified before the House Judiciary Committee on 
February 7, 1965,189 Poff modeled behavior consistent with Nixon’s 
urging.190  Poff urged that all should “recognize candidly what hasn’t yet 
been articulated”—that the Bayh-Celler proposal “is the end result, the 
precipitant of a long process of distillation and filtration in which many hands 
have played a part.”191  Poff emphasized that it was “not a carelessly drawn 
measure” because he was “anxious” that Congress take “expeditious 
action . . . on this vitally important matter.”192  Poff disclaimed any intent to 
“unduly” probe Bayh’s proposal, telling Bayh, “I want to see this thing done 
as expeditiously as possible and I am willing to compromise.”193  Later 
during the hearings, Poff expressed disagreement with allowing the Cabinet 
(as opposed to just the Vice President) to initiate a presidential disability 
determination, but indicated that he was “prepared to make a compromise, if 
necessary, to get something done,” because he “want[ed] to see something 
done promptly.”194   
Some independent witnesses who promoted different proposals also called 
for cooperation.  Marion B. Folsom, Eisenhower’s former Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, testified on behalf of the Committee on 
Economic Development195 and suggested an approach that differed 
somewhat from Bayh’s proposal.196  Nonetheless he said that Senators should 
 
 186. Id. at 53 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits) (announcing an amendment to S.J. Res. 
138 that would require Congress to elect a Vice President in a joint session “by and with the 
advice and consent” of the President).  The change would grant the President the “authority to 
reject a nominee who is unsuitable to him. Id.  
 187. BAYH, supra note 10, at 135–36. 
 188. Id. at 99–101. 
 189. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 114, at 39–70, 77–95 (testimony of Sen. Birch 
Bayh). 
 190. Id. at 45–63. 
 191. Id. at 63. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 86. 
 194. Id. at 167. 
 195. 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 130, at 46–55 (statement of Marion B. Folsom, 
Chairman, Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, Committee for 
Economic Development). 
 196. See id. at 48 (favoring the confirmation of the Vice President by a joint session of 
Congress and the initiation of an inability determination by Cabinet rather than the Vice 
President); id. at 49 (opposing the use of Congress as the decider of a disagreement between 
the President and Vice President regarding presidential inability and suggesting that the 
Cabinet is better suited for that role). 
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pass Bayh’s proposal without changes if they thought it most likely to win 
approval.197 
D.  Legislative Efforts 
Republicans also played crucial roles at virtually every stage of the 
legislative efforts that resulted in the passage by the House and Senate of the 
proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment in summer 1965. 
1.  1964 Republican Collaboration:  The Senate 
Although Bayh initially introduced S.J. Res 139 with only the 
cosponsorship of Democratic Senator Edward V. Long (Missouri), 
Republican Senators James Pearson (Kansas) and Hiram Fong (Hawaii) 
joined as cosponsors in March198 and April199 of 1964.  By the time the 
Senate considered S.J. Res. 139, ten of the thirty cosponsors were 
Republicans.200 
Republicans, including Fong and Keating, worked with Bayh to refine S.J. 
Res. 139 in May 1964 before reporting it to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
with the understanding that Keating would seek to amend it with his proposal 
on the floor.201  Although the Republican Minority Leader, Senator Everett 
Dirksen (Illinois), was not yet prepared to support the measure202 and 
Keating preferred his own approach, the Subcommittee voted unanimously 
to report S.J. Res. 139 to the full Committee203 on May 27, 1964.204  In early 
August 1964, the full Judiciary Committee unanimously reported S.J. 
Res. 139 to the Senate with the understanding that amendments could be 
offered to it including by Committee members.205 
When Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield advised Bayh on 
September 28, 1964, that the Senate could consider S.J. Res. 139 that very 
afternoon,206 both Keating and Senator Roman Hruska, who wanted to 
propose changes, were out of town.207  Both Republicans agreed to release 
 
 197. Id. at 50; see 1965 House Hearings, supra note 114, at 166 (statement of Marion B. 
Folsom, Chairman, Committee for Improvement of Management in Government, Committee 
for Economic Development) (“That is why we think you ought to have this amendment, one 
way or the other.  Whether you go along with the Bayh amendment or not, we think it is 
necessary that something be done.”). 
 198. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 250–52. 
 199. BAYH, supra note 10, at 101–02. 
 200. The Republican cosponsors were Senators Clifford Case (New Jersey), John Sherman 
Cooper (Kentucky), Peter Dominick (Colorado), Jacob Javits (New York), Thomas Kuchel 
(California), James Pearson (Kansas), Leverett Saltonstall (Maine), Hugh Scott 
(Pennsylvania), Milward Simpson (Wyoming), and Hiram Fong (Hawaii). See S.J. Res. 139, 
88th Cong. (1964). 
 201. BAYH, supra note 10, at 127–28. 
 202. Id. at 106–07, 127. 
 203. Id. at 128. 
 204. Cabell Phillips, Presidential Disability Amendment Is Voted by Senate Panel, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 1964, at 22. 
 205. BAYH, supra note 10, at 130–33; see also S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 1 (1964). 
 206. BAYH, supra note 10, at 138. 
 207. Id. at 140. 
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Bayh from the understanding that they would have the opportunity to offer 
amendments so he could proceed in their absence.208 
Four209 of the eleven Senators who spoke in favor of S.J. Res. 139 that day 
were Republicans.210  The measure carried on a voice vote.211  After 
Democratic Senator John Stennis (Mississippi) objected the following day 
that a proposed constitutional amendment should require a recorded vote,212 
the Senate passed the measure by a vote of 65 to 0 with Republicans 
providing 21 of the aye votes, including those of Minority Leader Dirksen 
and Republican Whip Thomas Kuchel, respectively.213  Some nine of the 
absent thirteen Republican Senators were recorded as supporting S.J. Res. 
139.214  Accordingly, thirty of the thirty-four Republican Senators, or 88 
percent, supported the measure.215 
The House of Representatives predictably took no action in 1964.216  The 
November 1964 election of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey as Johnson’s Vice 
President and his inauguration on January 20, 1965, mitigated the appearance 
that section 2 was directed against McCormack.217  Johnson’s landslide 
election had coattails that produced a new Senate in which Democrats held 
sixty-eight (of 100 seats) and a House in which they held 295 (of 435) seats.  
Keating, the leading proponent of the congressional-enabling approach, lost 
his seat to Robert F. Kennedy.218 
2.  Winning Celler’s Support:  Calling on Brownell Again 
Bayh reintroduced his proposal in the new Congress as S.J. Res. 1.  He 
hoped to have Celler, the House Judiciary Committee chair, offer the 
identical measure in the House given his position, long association with the 
issue, and standing in the House.219  Celler had served in Congress since 
1923, forty years more than Bayh, and worked on presidential inability for a 
decade,220 so understandably might not have been disposed to defer to a 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. 110 CONG. REC. 22,992–93 (1964) (statement of Sen. Saltonstall); id. at 22,993–94 
(statement of Sen. Fong); id. at 22,999–23,000 (statement of Sen. Javits); id. at 23,000–01 
(statement of Sen. Pearson). 
 210. In addition to the four Republican Senators, seven Democratic Senators spoke in favor 
of S.J. Res. 139. Id. at 22,983, 22,986–88 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 22,988–92 (statement 
of Sen. Ervin); id. at 22,990–92 (statement of Sen. Monroney); id. at 22,994 (statement of Sen. 
Bible); id. at 22,997–99 (statement of Sen. Church); id. at 23,000 (statement of Sen. Hart); id. 
at 23,001 (statement of Sen. Mansfield). 
 211. Id. at 23,000–01. 
 212. Id. at 23,056. 
 213. Id. at 23,061. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. BAYH, supra note 10, at 159–60. 
 217. Id. at 161–62. 
 218. Id. at 181. 
 219. Id. at 162–63. 
 220. See, e.g., Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Address:  
The Problem of Presidential Inability—A Proposed Solution (Aug. 2, 1956), in 19 F.R.D. 153 
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newcomer.  In 1958, he had introduced legislation calling for the 
establishment of a commission on presidential inability composed of 
members of the executive and legislative branches to determine the beginning 
and end of a presidential inability.221  At the ABA’s National Forum in May 
1964, Celler proposed incorporating Cabinet succession such that the 
Secretary of State would become Vice President rather than Bayh’s method 
for filling a vice presidential vacancy.222 
Soliciting Celler’s support for Bayh’s proposal required someone of 
uncommon skill and stature.  Bayh and ABA officials decided that “the 
obvious person” to handle the delicate assignment was Brownell, who had 
already been “invaluable” in advancing Bayh’s proposal.223  Brownell went 
to see Celler and successfully persuaded him.224 
3.  1965 Republican Collaboration:  The Senate 
Because the Senate held extensive hearings in 1964 (and approved S.J. 
Res. 139 unanimously)225 and because S.J. Res. 1 had seventy-six 
cosponsors,226 Bayh held only a single day of hearings on January 29, 1965, 
to consider S.J. Res 1 and four other proposals.227  He announced that the 
hearings would “emphasize . . . views from those who differ in part or 
entirely from the consensus which has developed over the past year on this 
issue.”228  Nonetheless, during the 1965 Senate hearing, Fong supported S.J. 
Res. 1,229 as did Republican Senators Pearson,230 Javits,231 Leverett 
Saltonstall (Massachusetts),232 Karl Mundt (South Dakota),233 and Strom 
Thurmond (South Carolina), although Thurmond preferred to use the most 
recent presidential electors to fill a vice presidential vacancy.234 
After Bayh’s Subcommittee unanimously sent S.J. Res. 1 to the full 
Judiciary Committee in early February 1965,235 even Republicans with 
misgivings about the proposal worked to advance it.  Hruska acceded to a 
request by James Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to 
 
(proposing that the President or Vice President have the power to declare the President 
disabled). 
 221. H.R. 10880, 85th Cong. § 3 (1958). 
 222. Emanuel Celler, The Legislative History, Remarks at the ABA National Forum on 
Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy, supra note 128, at 9; Discussion, ABA 
National Forum on Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy, supra note 128, at 
16. 
 223. BAYH, supra note 10, at 162. 
 224. Id. at 162–63. 
 225. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting that the Senate passed S.J. Res. 
139 by a vote of 65 to 0). 
 226. 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 130, at 6 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 227. Id. at 1–5. 
 228. Id. at 5–6. 
 229. Id. at 30–32. 
 230. Id. at 101–02. 
 231. Id. at 105. 
 232. Id. at 103. 
 233. Id. at 106–07. 
 234. Id. at 105–06. 
 235. BAYH, supra note 10, at 202–03. 
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expedite consideration of the proposal rather than deploy procedural tactics 
to delay action since Senate floor time was most available early in the 
session.236  Dirksen accepted sections 1 and 2237 but proposed amendments 
to other portions.238  For instance, he pointed out that section 3 did not specify 
to whom the President’s disability declaration should go.239  Discussion 
between Senators Dirksen, Javits, Hruska, and Samuel Ervin produced a 
formulation contemplating a presidential declaration to the President of the 
Senate and Speaker of the House, which was adopted with Bayh’s 
approval.240  Some other relatively cosmetic changes were made.241  
Although Hruska objected to Congress playing an umpire role on separation 
of powers grounds,242 and he and Dirksen favored an enabling amendment 
similar to the one Keating had introduced in the prior Congress,243 the 
Committee unanimously reported S.J. Res. 1 as amended.244 
When the Senate considered S.J. Res. 1 on February 19, 1965, its advocates 
included Republican Senators Milward Simpson (Wyoming),245 Fong,246 
Saltonstall,247 Frank Carlson (Kansas),248 and ultimately, Hruska249 in 
addition to Bayh and Ervin.  Some Democratic Senators seemed critical or 
questioning of provisions of S.J. Res. 1,250 and the debate between Bayh and 
various Democrats was characterized as “heated” and “hot and 
acrimonious.”251  When Bayh was on the verge of accepting a change that 
 
 236. Id. at 206–07. 
 237. Id. at 209. 
 238. Id. at 208–09. 
 239. Id. at 210. 
 240. Id. at 210–11. 
 241. Id. at 212 (providing that other disability notifications by the President or Vice 
President would go to the Speaker and President of the Senate and replacing “immediately 
decide the issue” with “immediately proceed to decide the issue” in the section regarding 
Congress’s role in resolving an intraexecutive branch dispute). 
 242. S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 22–24 (1965) (providing the individual views of Senator Roman 
L. Hruska). 
 243. BAYH, supra note 10, at 212–13; see also S.J. Res. 6, 89th Cong. (1965); S. REP. NO. 
89-66, at 17–21 (1965) (providing the individual views of Senator Everett Dirksen); id. at 22–
24 (providing the individual views of Senator Roman L. Hruska). 
 244. BAYH, supra note 10, at 213; Feerick, supra note 4, at 187. 
 245. 111 CONG. REC. 3257–58 (1965). 
 246. Id. at 3261–63. 
 247. Id. at 3262–63. 
 248. Id. at 3265. 
 249. Id. at 3285. 
 250. See, e.g., id. at 3253–54 (statement of Sen. Ellender) (suggesting that Congress could 
legislatively address presidential inability); id. at 3256–57 (questioning a provision allowing 
Congress to create another body to act regarding presidential inability); id. at 3275, 3281 
(statement of Sen. Bass) (questioning the propriety of allowing congressmen from an opposing 
party to vote on vice presidential confirmation and suggesting a time limit for section 2); id. 
at 3275–76, 3278–79 (statement of Sen. Pastore) (calling for a time limit for Congress to act 
on presidential inability); id. at 3277 (statement of Sen. Harris) (calling for a time limit in 
section 2); id. at 3279 (statement of Sen. Hart) (suggesting a time limit for Congress to act on 
presidential inability). 
 251. Tom Wicker, Senate Votes Amendment on Presidential Disability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
20, 1965, at 1. 
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would have introduced procedural complications, the more experienced 
Hruska and Ervin dissuaded him.  Bayh later recognized that Hruska had 
helped in the February 1965 debate.252 
When Dirksen moved to substitute an enabling amendment for S.J. Res. 1, 
Republicans Simpson, Fong, Carlson, and Saltonstall were among those who 
spoke in favor of S.J. Res. 1 or against Dirksen’s proposal.253  The Dirksen 
substitute was defeated by a vote of 60 to 12.254  Although twelve 
Republicans voted for their leader’s proposal255 and five absent Republican 
Senators expressed support,256 thirteen Republican Senators voted against 
the Dirksen substitute and the absent Javits opposed it.257 
Although some like Republican Senator Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania) 
preferred the Dirksen substitute, they supported S.J. Res. 1 in order to adopt 
a “workable proposal.”258  S.J. Res. 1 carried 72 to 0, with 24 of the votes 
coming from Republicans.  The eight absent Republicans all were recorded 
as supporting the proposed amendment.259  In other words, 100 percent of 
Republican Senators were ultimately recorded as supporting S.J. Res. 1 on 
February 19, 1965. 
In addition to their votes and their voices, Republicans contributed in other 
ways during the Senate debate on S.J. Res. 1.  Hruska’s amendment to 
increase from two to seven days the time the Vice President and Cabinet 
would have to contest the President’s declaration of his capacity260 was 
accepted.  Some Republicans helped shape important legislative history.  
Saltonstall established that a Vice President acting as President would lose 
the ability to preside over the Senate.261  Senator Gordon Allott helped Bayh 
to establish legislative history supporting the view that the Vice President 
would continue to act as President during the period in which the Vice 
President and Cabinet could contest the President’s declaration.262 
 
 252. BAYH, supra note 10, at 273.  
 253. Id. at 253–260; see 111 CONG. REC. 3257–58 (1965) (statement of Sen. Simpson); id. 
at 3261–63 (statement of Sen. Fong); id. at 3265 (statement of Sen. Carlson); id. at 3271 
(statement of Sen. Saltonstall). 
 254. 111 CONG. REC. 3272 (1965).  It had been reported that Democratic Senator Eugene 
McCarthy (Minnesota) opposed a constitutional amendment and would support Dirksen’s 
enabling amendment rather than S.J. Res. 1. C.P. Trussell, M’Carthy Fights Disability Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1965, at 20.  McCarthy did not vote on the Dirksen substitute but was 
paired as supporting it. 111 CONG. REC. 3272 (1965). 
 255. 111 CONG. REC. 3272 (1965).  Those voting for the Dirksen substitute were Senators 
Bennett, Boggs, Case, Cotton, Dirksen, Hickenlooper, Prouty, Scott, Smith, Thurmond, 
Tower, and Williams. Id. 
 256. Id.  Senators Dominick, Miller, Morton, Jordan, and Kuchel, though absent, also 
preferred Dirksen’s substitute as did Democratic Senators Eugene McCarthy and Quentin 
Burdick. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 3263. 
 259. Id. at 3285–86. 
 260. Id. at 3274, 3276. 
 261. Id. at 3270. 
 262. Id. at 3285. 
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4.  1965 Republican Collaboration:  The House 
If anything, Republicans played an even more active role in the House of 
Representatives.  While Celler introduced H.R.J. Res. 1,263 which was 
identical to Bayh’s original S.J. Res. 1, McCulloch, the ranking minority 
member on the Judiciary Committee, and Poff each introduced amendments 
that largely tracked the Bayh-Celler proposal with an important difference.  
H.R.J. Res. 1 provided that if the Vice President and Cabinet contested the 
President’s declaration of capacity, Congress must “immediately decide the 
issue.”264  By contrast, S.J. Res. 1, as amended by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, provided that Congress must “immediately proceed to decide the 
issue.”265  Unlike the Bayh and Celler proposals, McCulloch266 and Poff267 
each imposed a ten-day time limit for Congress to resolve such an 
intraexecutive branch disagreement.  However, their proposals differed 
slightly in that McCulloch’s ten-day period ran from the transmittal of the 
President’s declaration of fitness268 whereas Poff gave Congress ten days 
from receipt of the Vice President’s letter challenging the President’s 
declaration.269 
The House began four days of hearings on February 9, 1965, ten days 
before the Senate passed S.J. Res. 1.270  In his opening statement, McCulloch 
spoke of the urgency of the issues that the Bayh-Celler amendment 
addressed; however, he expressed unease at the “speed” with which the 
proposal was progressing since “[u]ndue haste could lead to oversight, 
imperfection, and regret.”271  He explained that in most respects, his proposal 
was identical to H.R.J. Res. 1,272 but that he thought that “a definite time 
period should be established”273 for Congress to resolve an executive branch 
dispute regarding presidential inability, even though he was “not wedded to 
a particular time period.”274 McCulloch viewed the concept of immediate 
action in the Bayh-Celler proposal as too indefinite.275 
Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee participated 
actively in its 1965 hearings.  Representatives Arch Moore, Charles Mathias, 
 
 263. H.R.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong. (1965). 
 264. Id. § 5. 
 265. S.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong. § 5 (1965); BAYH, supra note 10, at 212. 
 266. H.R.J. Res. 119, 89th Cong. § 5 (1965); 1965 House Hearings, supra note 114, at 3–
4 (statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch). 
 267. H.R.J. Res. 3, 89th Cong. § 5 (1965); 1965 House Hearings, supra note 114, at 68 
(statement of Rep. Richard Poff). 
 268. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 114, at 4 (statement of Rep. William M. 
McCulloch). 
 269. Id. at 68. 
 270. See id. at I. 
 271. Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch). 
 272. Id. at 4. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 67–68 (statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch) (describing the ten-day limit 
as “arbitrary”). 
 275. Id. at 231–32, 236. 
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and McCulloch questioned Bayh regarding the meaning of “principal officers 
of the executive departments” in the disability provisions of S.J. Res. 1.276  
Moore asked whether someone other than the President or Vice President 
should be able to initiate an inability determination.277  He and other 
Republicans raised concerns regarding forcing Congress to resolve an 
intraexecutive dispute quickly.278  Mathias discussed the use of impeachment 
against a Vice President who refused to relinquish power to the President,279 
challenged the vice presidential vacancy provision,280 and questioned the 
impact of allowing Congress to umpire an intraexecutive branch dispute on 
presidential inability.281  During Bayh’s testimony, Moore observed that “it 
is fair to determine from the manner of the questions and the questions 
themselves that we are interested in this.  We want to see the problem and it 
is a very severe problem as far as the administration of our Government is 
concerned, solved.”282  Later Poff, McCulloch, Mathias, Moore, and Lindsay 
engaged intensively with Katzenbach.283 
No Republican worked harder to improve the amendment than did Poff.  
During Bayh’s House testimony, Poff made numerous suggestions that 
reflected the careful attention he had given the Bayh-Celler proposal.284  Poff 
and McCulloch pressed Bayh about the need for a specific time limit for 
Congress to decide an intrabranch dispute285 and Poff repeatedly advocated 
a time limit on congressional action during hearings.286  Bayh resisted the 
idea, owing to the sensitivity of time limits for some Senators and because a 
more flexible approach would allow handling different situations differently. 
Although the discussion of the time limit signaled a difference between the 
Bayh-Celler and McCulloch-Poff approaches, Poff helped Bayh in other 
respects.  When a number of predominantly Democratic representatives 
 
 276. Id. at 59–60 (statements of Reps. Arch Moore, Charles Mathias, and William M. 
McCulloch). 
 277. Id. at 79–81 (statement of Arch Moore). 
 278. Id. at 85–86. 
 279. Id. at 88–89 (statement of Charles Mathias). 
 280. Id. at 89–92. 
 281. Id. at 92–93. 
 282. Id. at 85. 
 283. Id. at 97–98, 100–02, 104 (statements of Reps. Richard Poff, William M. McCulloch, 
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 284. See id. at 64–65 (statement of Rep. Richard Poff) (suggesting that the Acting President 
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at 66 (requiring the President to “promptly” nominate a Vice President); id. at 78 (discussing 
the merits of allowing the “person next in line of presidential succession” to initiate a disability 
action in absence of a Vice President); id. at 81–84 (discussing the merits of allowing the 
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absence of a Vice President).  Poff was helped by a letter from John D. Feerick outlining areas 
of inquiry. See Letter from John D. Feerick to Richard Poff (Feb. 7, 1965), 
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 285. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 114, at 66–70 (statements of Reps. Richard Poff 
and William M. McCulloch). 
 286. Id. at 187, 233–34, 236–37 (statement of Rep. Richard Poff). 
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posed critical questions at the outset of the hearing,287 Poff interjected to 
point out the care and deliberation that had gone into the Bayh-Celler 
proposal.288  Poff defended the provisions of H.R.J. Res. 1 during 
hearings.289  Poff also helped Bayh to craft important legislative history on a 
number of points.290  In fact, when Bayh misstated one conclusion, Poff 
interjected to indicate that Bayh had misunderstood the question, thus 
allowing Bayh to correct his testimony.291 
When the House Committee on the Judiciary reported H.R.J. Res. 1 to the 
House on March 24, 1965, two facts suggested the Republican influence.  
First, ranking member McCulloch, not Committee chair and H.R.J. Res. 1 
author Celler, presented the report.292  Second, the reported version of 
H.R.J. Res. 1 had been amended to include a ten-day time limit for 
congressional action measured from receipt of the written declaration of the 
Vice President and Cabinet contesting the President’s declaration of 
fitness.293  H.R.J. Res. 1 was still Bayh-Celler, but in this respect, it was also 
Poff-McCulloch. 
When H.R.J. Res. 1 came to the floor on April 13, 1965, Celler began his 
opening remarks by noting that the measure had “bipartisan support” and 
singling out for praise “particularly” McCulloch and Poff, “who participated 
in the fashioning and polishing of this resolution.  They did so most wisely 
and painstakingly.  They immersed themselves into the intricacies of the 
legislation.  Their help was immeasurable.”294  Celler went on to praise “the 
constructive work done by most of the members of our committee, 
Democrats, and Republicans alike,” and specifically mentioned Republicans 
John V. Lindsay (New York) and William C. Cramer (Florida), along with 
six Democrats.295 
When Republican Representative Durward Hall (Missouri), a physician, 
questioned the lack of medical testimony during the hearings and inquired 
whether medical personnel would be consulted in a disability 
determination,296 Poff came to Celler’s aid.297  Poff pointed out that Brownell 
had relied on medical opinions in advising Nixon and the Cabinet that no 
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formal transfer was needed and suggested that future decision-makers would 
surely consult medical professionals,298 a point Republican Representative 
Clark McGregor (Minnesota) reinforced.299 
Poff described H.R.J. Res. 1 as involving “some degree of compromise,” 
praised Celler as “an impartial, fair-minded arbiter” who “stood firm when 
firmness was necessary but has yielded when logic dictated,” and said no 
“partisan consideration was advanced” in the Committee’s deliberations.300  
Poff provided a scholarly justification for H.R.J. Res. 1, which explained and 
justified the changes made during the Committee’s deliberation.  In 
particular, H.R.J. Res. 1 as amended made clear that a President who 
voluntarily transferred power could resume powers immediately upon his 
written declaration of his fitness, required Congress to assemble if not in 
session, and added a time limit for Congress to act within ten days.301  
McCulloch largely echoed Poff’s defense.302  Other Republicans, including 
Representatives Frank Horton (New York),303 Willard S. Curtin 
(Pennsylvania),304 Robert Stafford (Vermont),305 Robert McClory 
(Illinois),306 James Battin (Montana),307 Lindsay,308 William Cahill (New 
Jersey),309 Seymour Halpern (New York),310 and F. Bradford Morse 
(Massachusetts),311 also filed statements supporting H.R.J. Res. 1. 
Poff, McCulloch, and other Republicans helped defend H.R.J. Res. 1 from 
amendments on the House floor (some proposed by other Republicans).  
When Democratic Representative Roman Pucinski (Illinois) sought to strike 
section 2, Poff argued that his premise was wrong in thinking that section 2 
would repeal the 1947 succession law which placed the Speaker after the 
President and Vice President.312  Lindsay offered other passionate arguments 
in opposition.313  When Republican Representative Charles Jonas (North 
Carolina) suggested that the Vice President’s appointment be temporary 
pending a special election,314 McCulloch pointed out that a special election 
would be costly and might produce a Vice President from the opposing 
party.315  When Moore proposed amending H.R.J. Res. 1 so that the President 
would exercise powers while Congress resolved a dispute over his 
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capacity,316 McClory was among those who objected that Moore’s 
amendment would contribute to instability.317 
Poff, at McCormack’s request, offered the one floor amendment that was 
accepted.318  It required Congress to reassemble within forty-eight hours if 
not in session in response to the Vice President’s challenge to a President’s 
assertion of his ability to resume his powers and duties.319  Poff’s willingness 
to accommodate the Speaker was further evidence of the bipartisan spirit that 
pervaded the treatment of H.R.J. Res. 1. 
Just as he had during hearings, Poff helped make important legislative 
history through his comments during debate.320  Of the 140 Republicans, 122 
voted for H.R.J. Res. 1 and only eight opposed it on April 13, 1965.321 
5.  Collaboration:  The Conference and Adoption 
To resolve the differences between the House and Senate regarding the 
content of the proposed amendment, a conference committee was 
appointed.322  The committee included, from each body, three Democrats—
Senators Eastland, Ervin, and Bayh, and Representatives Celler, Byron G. 
Rogers (Colorado), and James C. Corman (California).323  The committee 
also contained two Republicans from each body—Senators Dirksen and 
Hruska, and Representatives McCulloch and Poff.324  The conferees 
ultimately resolved the differences, the major one being a compromise 
between the House’s ten-day McCulloch-Poff limit for Congress to resolve 
an intraexecutive branch dispute and the Senate formulation that encouraged 
“immediate” action without any time limit.325  McCulloch was, apparently, 
reluctant to move from the House’s position.326  Although the Democratic 
majority would have allowed the conference committee to complete its work 
on a partisan basis, Bayh and Celler were anxious to reach a bipartisan and 
unanimous agreement.327  After two months of meetings, both sides agreed 
to a twenty-one day period.328  Quicker agreement was reached on other 
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matters.  The House version of section 3 was adopted, which allowed a 
President who had voluntarily transferred power to reclaim it based on a 
similar declaration.329  The conferees compromised between the two- and 
seven-day limits for the Vice President and Cabinet to respond to the 
President’s declaration by agreeing to a four-day period.330  Poff’s 
amendment that required Congress to convene within forty-eight hours was 
accepted.331  In addition, at Hruska’s urging, language in section 4 was 
modified to make clear that even if Congress created some “other body” to 
replace the Cabinet, the Vice President would remain a necessary actor.332 
Although the House quickly agreed to the conference report on June 30, 
1965,333 Senate proceedings provided more drama.  Bayh presented and 
explained the conference report and thanked all who had contributed, 
“especially” Hruska,334 and Hruska called for approval of the report.335  The 
discussion became contentious as Democratic Senators Eugene McCarthy 
(Minnesota) and Al Gore Sr. (Tennessee) began to criticize the amendment.  
Gore, in particular, suggested that the language of section 4 allowed Congress 
to supplement the Cabinet by creating an “other body” that could allow the 
Vice President to shop between the Cabinet or that “other body” for an 
agreeable partner to oust the President.336  Gore’s point was directed at 
language added during the conference at Hruska’s insistence to clarify that 
the Vice President was a necessary participant in a determination of 
presidential inability even if Congress created “[an]other body” to replace the 
Cabinet.337 
Once again, Republicans came to Bayh’s aid to help address arguments 
advanced by Democrats.  John Sherman Cooper (Kentucky) engaged in a 
colloquy with Bayh to establish legislative intent that creation of “[an]other 
body” to act with the Vice President would supplant, not supplement, the 
Cabinet338 and that the vice president would be a necessary party to the 
decision in any case.339  After Gore persisted, another Republican, Javits, 
came to Bayh’s aid to argue that Congress could specify that an “other body” 
would be exclusive but that in any event he did not think the language was 
ambiguous.340 
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When the Senate returned to the matter on July 6, 1965, Javits promptly 
reaffirmed his support.341  Although Ervin assumed the burden of replying to 
Gore, so, too, did Dirksen,342 Javits,343 and Cooper.344 
Ultimately, the conference report passed sixty-eight to five, with the 
opponents consisting of four Democrats and one Republican.345  Twenty-one 
Republicans voted for the proposed amendment and eight of the ten absent 
Republicans announced their support.346 
III.  LESSONS FROM A BIPARTISAN ACCOMPLISHMENT 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment is properly called the Bayh Amendment in 
recognition of Bayh’s able and indispensable leadership.  Yet the proposed 
amendment went to the states covered with Republican fingerprints.  Sections 
1, 3, and 4 followed the basic approach of the Eisenhower-Brownell-Rogers 
proposal from 1958.  Hruska added the seven-day challenge period for the 
Vice President under section 4347 (later compromised to four days)348 and 
language to clarify that the Vice President was a necessary party to a section 
4 determination.349  Poff added the requirement that Congress reconvene in 
response to the Vice President and Cabinet challenging a presidential 
declaration.350  The twenty-one-day time period for Congress to resolve an 
intraexecutive branch conflict was a compromise forced by the McCulloch-
Poff ten-day limit.351  Eisenhower, Brownell, and Nixon helped shape the 
public and congressional disposition to find a solution; McCulloch, Poff, 
Hruska, Dirksen, Javits, Cooper, and others made helpful floor statements; 
Poff and others helped create important legislative history; and many 
Republicans and Democrats compromised and supported a product different 
from the one they would have preferred.352 
The bipartisan character of the effort was celebrated.  During the 
September 1964 Senate debate, Mansfield expressed pleasure that S.J. 
Res. 139 commanded support “on both sides of the aisle.”353  President 
Johnson’s message to Congress on January 28, 1965, supporting S.J. Res. 1 
and H.R.J. Res. 1 acknowledged a “consensus of an overwhelming” 
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congressional majority “without thought of partisanship” committed to 
prompt action.354 
Some unique factors invited bipartisan behavior.  The onerous and multiple 
supermajority requirements associated with constitutional amendment 
provided special incentive for bipartisanship.  Even the Johnson 1964 
landslide, which gave Democrats 68 percent of each house of Congress, did 
not render bipartisanship unnecessary.  While some Democrats, like Gore 
and McCarthy, were vocal Senate critics,355 and twenty-one House 
Democrats voted against H.R.J. Res. 1 in April 1965,356 several Republicans, 
like Poff, McCulloch, Dirksen, Hruska, Cooper, and Javits, advocated for 
Bayh-Celler.  House Republicans supported H.R.J. Res. 1 at roughly the same 
rate as Democrats.  Bayh recognized that the two-thirds requirement 
cautioned against making the issue partisan.357  When Dirksen stated at a 
1965 markup that something was agreeable to “the Minority,” Bayh’s 
antennae went up for fear that the issue would become partisan.358 
The fact that presidential succession and inability and Vice Presidential 
vacancy were not campaign issues mitigated partisan pressures.  Since a 
legislator’s position on Bayh-Celler would affect few, if any, election votes, 
lawmakers felt free to act based on their perception of the public interest with 
limited regard to partisan considerations.  The Amendment did not favor one 
party or the other (and, ironically, the first six applications of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment have been in Republican administrations).359  Interest 
groups were not heavily engaged and the ABA was an independent and 
respected nonpartisan endorser. 
Finally, the two parties were not as ideologically aligned in the mid-1960s 
as they later became.  Republican liberals and moderates held seats in 
industrial states and in New England, and Democratic conservatives still 
dominated the South.  Although ideology did not drive behavior on the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the nonideological nature of the parties made 
bipartisan cooperation more the norm than the exception.  Many other 
measures in the mid-1960s—such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965—had bipartisan 
support. 
Yet bipartisanship did not simply happen.  Bayh and others contributed to 
the bipartisan quality of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment by structuring the 
proposal and proceedings to encourage Republican participation.  By 
incorporating the Eisenhower-Brownell-Rogers 1958 amendment as the 
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framework for the disability provisions of his resolution, Bayh made it more 
likely that Eisenhower Republicans would support his proposal. 
Bayh and his ABA allies adopted an inclusive approach.  They consciously 
included Republicans like Brownell and Eisenhower in visible roles and were 
solicitous to Republican legislators.  They made a point to work closely with 
Republicans including Dirksen and his staff, and with McCulloch and Poff, 
knowing that their support would be important.360  Bayh encouraged 
exchange with others, including Republicans, to improve the measure and 
broaden support.  When Poff justified his probing questioning during the 
1965 House hearing, Bayh replied that no apology was needed because “[t]he 
more questions we ask and the more we try to delve into each other’s minds, 
the more all of us can see the difficulty of solving this problem and the more 
opportunity we will have of finding a solution.  So fire away.”361  McCulloch 
justified the extensive questioning regarding a proposed constitutional 
amendment and criticized some (but not Bayh, he hastened to add) “who have 
raised the question of some of the minority to try to improve” the Bayh-Celler 
proposal.362  Bayh repeatedly expressed his willingness to consider 
objections and compromise.363  Many on both sides of the aisle had reason 
to feel part of the process. 
This inclusive disposition developed and spread because leaders on both 
sides of the aisle preached and modeled a collaborative, problem-solving 
approach to the issue.  That was Nixon’s message in his March 1964 
testimony, and it was apparent when Keating accommodated Bayh’s wish to 
bring S.J. 139 to the floor, when Javits abandoned his proposal in favor of 
Bayh’s, and when Dirksen and Hruska championed S.J. Res. 1 after their 
amendments were defeated.  Bayh argued at the Senate’s 1965 hearings that 
the failure to solve problems regarding presidential inability was not due to a 
lack of proposals but rather because of “a refusal or reluctance on the part of 
the proposers to sit down and work out an agreement which we admit is not 
perfect, but which is better than no solution at all.”364  Democrats, like Bayh, 
Ervin, and Katzenbach, also compromised.  Partisans on both sides of the 
aisle seemed to respond to the words and deeds that encouraged and modeled 
accommodation. 
Bayh also recognized that Eisenhower, Nixon, and Brownell could speak 
powerfully regarding presidential inability and the rise of the vice presidency 
from their experiences during the Eisenhower administration.  He gave them 
prominent roles in the hearings he held, the ABA made Eisenhower and 
Brownell featured speakers at its forum, and Bayh and other Democrats often 
cited them as authorities in discussions of the proposal.  In arguing that letter 
agreements were insufficient, Bayh pointed out that both Eisenhower and 
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Nixon had taken that position.365  When Folsom spoke of the difficult 
position of the Vice President during presidential disability deliberations 
based on the Eisenhower experiences,366 Bayh replied that Eisenhower 
thought that the Vice President had an inescapable constitutional 
responsibility.367  Celler invoked Brownell’s earlier rationale for why a 
constitutional amendment was needed368 and quoted Brownell in response to 
criticism from Republican Representative Clarence Brown (Ohio).369  
Democratic Senators often invoked Eisenhower’s observations.370 
A proposal supported by Eisenhower and Johnson; Brownell and 
Katzenbach; Javits, Cooper, and Ervin; and Poff, McCulloch, and Celler 
became harder to challenge.  Alternatives, like the enabling approach, could 
not overcome the bipartisan pedigree of Bayh’s proposal.  Ultimately the 
arguments ended up being over details, like whether to include time limits 
and whether creation of an “other body” would supplant or supplement the 
Cabinet.  It was easier to obtain the two-thirds majorities in the House and 
Senate since proponents of the proposal could seek support from all 
members, not simply Democratic ones.  And the bipartisan support of the 
measure strengthened the prospects of ratification of the proposed Twenty-
Fifth Amendment. 
What produced the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was the willingness of 
legislators of both parties to focus on the national interest and on problem 
solving and to operate in a way that encouraged those dispositions.  
Democrats and Republicans agreed that existing provisions regarding 
presidential succession and inability were inadequate, presented perils, and 
needed to be addressed.  They agreed that the status quo was unacceptable 
and presented a less attractive option than alternative courses.  This 
disposition informed much behavior and persisted and grew as the proposal 
passed the various stages of the bicameral amendment process before being 
submitted to the states for ratification. 
Rather than allowing disagreements to prevent achievement, the 
participants emphasized and built upon their common ground.  In so doing, 
Republicans and Democrats together effectively addressed a problem that 
had confounded the founding fathers and America for 180 years. 
IV.  PARTISANSHIP (AND BIPARTISANSHIP) IN A BROADER CONTEXT 
Partisanship is, of course, one, but only one, of the ways in which 
legislators and voters organize themselves to compete for political power and 
to pursue policy objectives.  Bipartisanship involves a recognition that 
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sometimes it is advantageous to work with partisan rivals to identify and 
pursue objectives collaboratively rather than competitively. 
Partisanship is by no means the only obstacle to cooperative political 
behavior.  People organize based on a range of demographic and other 
factors.  Sometimes institutional commitments dictate political behavior and 
impede cooperation, such as when different legislative committees battle 
over jurisdiction, when Senators and representatives insist on the product of 
their own house, or when congressmen and executive officials divide 
regarding separation of powers issues.  Sometimes egotism presents the 
obstacle as when people are unwilling to relinquish their own proposal or 
cede or share credit.  Many of these divisions appeared when Congress 
considered how to address presidential succession and inability during the 
mid-1960s. 
The hearings and debates on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment included 
numerous statements from members of Congress and other experts on the 
issue, all of which ran to nearly 1000 pages.  Yet the voluminous legislative 
record contains no wiser or more eloquent statement of the challenge of 
collaborative problem solving than three paragraphs in the remarks of a 
twenty-seven-year-old lawyer testifying before Congress for the very first 
time during the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Amendments on February 28, 1964.  Here are those words: 
Perhaps one of the main reasons for the continued failure to solve this 
problem has been the great diversity of proposals.  All have some merit.  
None is completely without objection.  Each proposal has its adherents.  No 
proposal has ever commanded enough support to be adopted.  I am 
convinced that this problem can be solved. 
However, I am equally convinced that the problem will never be solved 
if the trend persists whereby each of us stubbornly adheres to his own point 
of view.  If this problem is ever to be solved men must agree and if they are 
to agree, they must actively work at it. 
The time has come for those who are genuinely interested in the safety 
of this Nation to stop emphasizing those points on which they differ and to 
start emphasizing those points on which they agree.  It is urgent that the 
problem be solved now.  To miss this opportunity and again leave unsolved 
one of the most serious problems ever to confront the Congress would be 
to trifle with the security of this great Nation.  Therefore, we must make 
every human effort to agree on a workable solution.371 
This comment diagnosed the perennial problem that had prevented 
progress on presidential succession and inability as well as in many other 
areas.  It is easier to disagree than to agree, but a chorus making “My Way” 
the common creed is not the route to solving communal problems.  Instead, 
we must prioritize problem solving, talk to one another, focus on the common 
objective, and build from areas of agreement, rather than emphasize 
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differences.  And work, work, work!  The message was optimistic in its faith 
that the problem could be solved but realistic regarding the challenges.  It 
was prescient in suggesting the urgent need for a solution and wise in 
recognizing that focusing on common interests and shared ideas was the route 
to collaboration and agreement. 
Bayh embraced the message he heard at the February 28, 1964, hearings 
and professed it.  During the January 29, 1965, Senate hearing, Bayh 
remarked that the obstacle to dealing with presidential inability historically 
had been the “many different proposals and a refusal or reluctance on the part 
of the proposers to sit down and work out an agreement which we admit is 
not perfect, but which is better than no solution at all.”372  Bayh closed his 
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on February 9, 1965, by 
expressing a thought quite similar to the one he had heard a year earlier: 
The main barrier, I want to emphasize, to our ability to find a solution has 
been the fact that so far we have had so many different opinions that we 
have never been able to come close to a consensus . . . .  This in no way 
precludes this body from making improvements to the consensus, but I 
would ask you to consider once again the impossibility of finding 
perfection and the gravity of the situation which now exists in which we 
have no answer whatsoever.373 
People of Fordham no doubt recognize those words of that young witness 
as the voice of John Feerick and recognize in the 1964 statement the enduring 
message and course of a lifetime.  Those words resonated in Congress, and 
the suggested approach helped Bayh, the ABA, and their Republican allies to 
bridge the various partisan and institutional divides in order to propose the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
Of course there are problems that resist solution, where the common 
ground is too small or the divisions too deep or the emotions too raw.  It takes 
two to tango, and sometimes there is not a willing partner.  And, not all parties 
will have the patience or the wisdom or the skill to find the sweet spot where 
collaboration can occur. 
But one-half century ago, the “Feerick Way” helped Congress solve 
problems that the likes of George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and 
James Madison had left to future generations—problems their successors had 
exacerbated and failed to solve for nearly 180 years.  Perhaps that same 
approach—the approach that provided the foundation for the bipartisan effort 
that led to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment—can also help us to solve many of 
the problems that currently afflict our communities, our nation, and the world 
in which we live.  I hope so. 
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